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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILADELPHIA 
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INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR 
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; MICHAEL DUFFY, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A POLICE OFFICER FOR 
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-04499) 
Before: Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman 
 
Argued 
March 10, 1999 
 
Before: MANSMANN, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we must first determine whether our 
requirement that a district court provide a brief statement 
of reasons in certifying a judgment for appeal pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) precludes our exercise of jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal where we are otherwise able to ascertain 
the propriety of the certification from the record. Exercise of 
jurisdiction and consideration on the merits in turn require 
that we decide, as a matter of first impression, whether 
Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to 
Philadelphia District Attorneys for claims arising from 
administrative and policymaking - rather than 
prosecutorial - functions. We must also determine whether, 
if sovereign immunity does not apply, the official capacity 
claims are alternatively barred by absolute prosecutorial 
immunity. Finally, we must consider whether claims 
against unknown policymakers in the Philadelphia District 
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Attorney's Office in their personal capacity have been 
adequately pled. 
 
The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office contends that 
because the DA's Office acts in the name of the 
Commonwealth and carries out a sovereign function, it is 
entitled to share in the Commonwealth's sovereign 
immunity as an arm of the state. The District Court 
accepted this contention, holding that application of the 
factors by which we determine Eleventh Amendment 
immunity weighed "strongly in favor of finding that the 
District Attorney's Office, when performing its historic 
functions of investigating and prosecuting crimes on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, is an `arm of the state' not subject 
to suit in federal court without its consent." 1 The District 
Court further dismissed claims against unknown 
policymakers in the DA's Office in their personal capacity 
for failure to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. 
 
Because we find that the consequences of the District 
Court's failure to provide a statement of reasons need not 
be visited on the parties by delaying resolution of their case 
when the ripeness of the appeal is apparent, we will 
exercise jurisdiction. On the merits, we find that (1) the 
performance of an essential sovereign function does not of 
itself give rise to state surrogate status under Pennsylvania 
law; (2) a correct application of the factors we set forth in 
Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655 
(3d Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), 
compels a finding that the Commonwealth's sovereign 
immunity does not encompass the DA's Office; and (3) even 
if the DA's Office were entitled to sovereign immunity as a 
state actor during the performance of its prosecutorial 
functions, such immunity would not extend to the local 
office administrative, investigative and management 
functions which underlie this action. We will, therefore, 
reverse the District Court's holding that the DA's Office is 
entitled to sovereign immunity for purposes of the claims at 
hand. We reject the alternative assertion of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity as lacking merit where the cause of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 4 F. Supp. 2d 386, 393 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
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action lies on administrative and investigative, rather than 
prosecutorial, conduct. Finally, because we find that the 
section 1983 claims against unknown policymakers in the 
DA's Office in their personal capacities have been 
adequately pled and Carter should be allowed to pursue 
discovery, we will also reverse the District Court's dismissal 
of those claims.2 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Raymond Carter had been convicted of murder and had 
served ten (10) years of a life sentence without possibility of 
parole before his conviction was overturned and the case 
against him nol prossed following disclosures of long- 
standing corruption within Philadelphia's 39th Police 
District.3 Carter then brought an action against the City of 
Philadelphia, named police officers,4  unknown employees of 
the Philadelphia Police Department, and unknown 
policymakers within the Philadelphia DA's Office.5 
 
Carter's action against individuals in the DA's Office was 
premised on their failure as administrators to establish 
training, supervision and discipline policies which would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Carter's state law claims when factually related federal claims remained 
pending against other defendants. Because we will reverse the District 
Court's dismissal of Carter's federal claims against the DA's Office, we 
need not address whether this was consistent with the sound exercise of 
judicial discretion. 
 
3. During disclosures of police misconduct uncovered during an 
investigation of that district, it came to light that the single 
eyewitness's 
testimony placing Carter at the murder scene - the testimony on which 
his conviction rested - was purchased by a 39th District officer, Thomas 
Ryan, from a prostitute-informant (Ms. Jenkins) with whom Ryan was 
intimate. In subsequent proceedings, Ryan was convicted of obstruction 
of justice and Jenkins admitted her perjured testimony. There was no 
forensic evidence linking Carter to the crime scene and Carter maintains 
his innocence. 
 
4. Carter names Thomas Ryan, Wayne Settle, and Michael Duffy 
individually and as police officers for the City of Philadelphia. 
 
5. Carter brings a section 1983 action, together with various state causes 
of action, against the defendants. 
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have (a) prevented or discouraged Philadelphia police 
officers from procuring perjurious "eyewitnesses" and (b) 
alerted assistant district attorneys to the falsity of such 
information and prevented its introduction as evidence.6 
The District Court dismissed all claims against the DA's 
Office, concluding that those defendants were"state 
officials" and therefore immune from suit for acts in their 
professional capacity by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.7 
It further concluded that Carter had failed to state a cause 
of action against those defendants in their personal 
capacities. Finally, it declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Carter's state law claims. The District 
Court subsequently entered a revised order rendering the 
judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b),8  but neglected to set 
forth specific findings in support of its decision to grant 
54(b) certification, despite our express direction in previous 
cases that district courts do so. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
Ordinarily, an order which terminates fewer than all 
claims, or claims against fewer than all parties, does not 
constitute a "final" order for purposes of appeal under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), however, provides that 
such an order may be final and immediately appealable 
under S 1291 when the district court makes an express 
determination that there is no just cause for delay and 
expressly directs entry of final judgment.9 We consistently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Carter also alleges that the DA's Office failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence found in its post-conviction investigation. 
 
7. The District Court framed the question before it as "[w]hether the 
District Attorney's Office, when performing its investigatory and 
prosecutorial functions, is an `arm of the state' under the Eleventh 
Amendment." Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 390. 
 
8. The order states that "[p]ursuant to Rule 54(b) . . . , the Court finds 
that there is no just reason for delay and, accordingly, directs that 
final 
judgment be entered in favor of [the DA's Office] and against Carter on 
all claims . . . ." 
 
9. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, . . ., 
       or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the 
       entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of 
the 
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require that district courts provide a statement of reasons 
when entering final judgment under Rule 54(b). See, e.g., 
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 610-11 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Anthius v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 
1003 (3d Cir. 1992); Metro Transportation Co. v. North Star 
Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 677 (3d Cir. 1990); Cemar, 
Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 897 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1990).10 
We have remanded cases in which a district court's failure 
to provide the reasons supporting its exercise of discretion 
renders us "unable to conclude that the granting of the 
Rule 54(b) certification was proper."11 We have not had 
occasion to address the result when, notwithstanding the 
absence of the required explanation, the propriety of appeal 
under 54(b) is apparent to the reviewing court on the 
record. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is 
       no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for entry of 
       judgment . . . . 
 
       Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
 
10. Our requirement that a district court accompany a Rule 54(b) 
certification with a statement of the reasons comes from our 
"endorse[ment]" and "incorporati[on]", in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975), of the Second 
Circuit's 
 
       suggest[ion] to the district courts that . . . it would be helpful 
to [the 
       appellate court] in reviewing the exercise of discretion in 
granting a 
       Rule 54(b) certification if the court . . . would make a brief 
reasoned 
       statement in support of its determination that `there is no just 
       reason for delay' and its express direction for`the entry of a 
final 
       judgment . . .' where the justification for the certification is 
not 
       apparent. 
 
Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoted 
in Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364) (emphasis added). 
 
11. Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 357; see also Cemar, 897 F.2d at 122 
(noting that "[b]ecause the reason for the Rule 54(b) certification [was] 
not 
apparent from the record", we required "a statement of reasons by the 
district court in order to determine the juridical concerns [were] met by 
its determination that no just reason remains for delay") (emphasis 
added). 
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Other courts of appeals have held that a district court's 
failure to state the reasons for its Rule 54(b) certification 
does not pose a jurisdictional barrier to appeal. The 
prevailing rule is perhaps best expressed in Bank of 
Lincolnwood v. Federal Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 
1980): 
 
       [Articulation of the considerations underlying the 
       district court's discretionary certification] constitutes 
       the "better practice," and the failure to provide a 
       written statement of reasons may in an appropriate 
       case lead to a remand for such a statement. 
 
       The statement is, however, primarily an aid to the 
       appellate court to permit it to review the exercise of the 
       trial court's discretion. The failure of the district court 
       to make a written statement at the time it makes a 
       54(b) certification is not a jurisdictional defect, . . . and 
       need not occasion even a remand if the basis for the 
       district court's determination is otherwise apparent. 
 
Id. at 948-49.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See also, e.g., Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 32 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (holding that appellate jurisdiction attached notwithstanding 
district court's failure to state reasons for certification where 
justification 
was apparent and sufficient); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 
F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding court of appeals had jurisdiction 
although district court did not provide reasoned explanation for 
certification where it was clear explanation could easily be provided and 
interest of sound judicial administration favored expeditious resolution 
of conflict); Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 
1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding appropriate certification of order 
dismissing all claims against one defendant where order and record 
taken together signaled district court's conclusion that requirements of 
the rule had been met); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding that 54(b) certification did not have "jurisdictional 
defect" 
merely because district court did not include specific findings regarding 
appropriateness of certification); Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of 
Educ., 114 F.3d 162 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that where reasons for 
entry of separate judgment for fewer than all parties or claims are 
obvious, and remand would result only in unnecessary delay in appeal 
process, the court of appeals will not require explanation; but when the 
sound basis for certification is not obvious, the court must dismiss the 
appeal for lack of final judgment). Cf. Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen 
Environmental Sys., 807 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that in 
absence of reasons for certification no deference will be given to 
decision 
to certify and reviewing propriety of certification de novo). 
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Although we have not yet addressed whether an appeal 
may go forward when, notwithstanding the absence of the 
required explanation, the propriety of certification under 
Rule 54(b) is apparent on the record, we have previously 
indicated that we share the prevailing view. See supra note 
11. In our recent decision in Waldorf, however, we indicated 
that we had dismissed an earlier appeal "for want of 
jurisdiction" because the district court failed to "provide a 
written opinion outlining its reasons for certification". 142 
F.3d at 611. See also Anthius v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp., 971 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992) (indicating that 
certification without explanation is not "competent" and we 
were therefore "obliged to dismiss").13 
 
Assuming that sufficient justification for certification may 
be discerned from the record in the present case, the Allis- 
Chalmers, Waldorf and Anthius cases are distinguishable 
because due to their complexities we were unable to 
conclude that certification was proper absent explication by 
the district court.14 In none of these cases was there any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. This interpretation may follow from Allis-Chalmers's holding that the 
54(b) certification "must be vacated because of the failure of the court 
to 
articulate reasons for the certification," 521 F.2d at 361, and from its 
statements that "[a] proper exercise of discretion under Rule 54(b) 
requires the district court to do more than just recite the 54(b) 
formula," 
and that "we incorporate [the giving of a brief reasoned statement] as a 
requirement for all Rule 54(b) certifications," id. at 364. But see Bank 
of 
Lincolnwood, 622 F.2d at 949 (citing Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 367 n. 
16 "(remanding case for a statement of reasons)" for the proposition that 
failure to provide a written explanation with certification is not a 
jurisdictional defect). 
 
14. See Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 365 (concluding that absent 
petitioner's demonstration of unusual or harsh circumstances, the 
presence of a counterclaim "weighed heavily" against the district court's 
grant of certification); Waldorf, 142 F.3d at 611-612 (discussing 
complexity of case and potential interrelationship of claims and cross- 
claims); Anthius, 971 F.2d at 1003 n.3 (stating that court's "familiarity 
with the issues and arguments" makes it "question whether there could 
ever be a proper exercise of judicial discretion which would result in an 
`entry of final judgment' certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)"). 
 
It should be noted that the holding of Allis-Chalmers as to the 
significance of counterclaims was rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980). 
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indication that the majority believed the propriety of the 
certification was apparent but that the appeal must 
nonetheless be dismissed.15 Consequently, any suggestion 
in the language of these cases that the Allis-Chalmers 
statement-of-reasons requirement deprives us of appellate 
jurisdiction where the propriety of the district court's 
certification is determinable from the record is, at most, 
dicta. That question remains open for our decision. 
 
A rule requiring remand or dismissal even when the 
propriety of immediate appeal is apparent would not 
optimally balance the competing concerns that must inform 
our interpretation of Rule 54(b). See Curtiss-Wright, 446 
U.S. at 2, 100 S. Ct. at 1462 (explaining that decision to 
certify must take into account the interests of sound 
judicial administration and the equities involved); Allis- 
Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 363 ("The rule attempts to strike a 
balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals 
and the need for making review available at a time that best 
serves the needs of the parties."); see also Waldorf, 142 
F.3d at 608 (observing that question in certification is 
whether the issue was "ready for appeal . . . tak[ing] into 
account judicial administrative interests as well as the 
equities involved"). 
 
In view of these concerns, Allis-Chalmers's requirement of 
a statement of reasons in every case stands not as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite but as a prophylactic means of 
enabling the appellate court to ensure that immediate 
appeal will advance the purposes of the rule.16 It follows 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Cf. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259, 1261 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that his dissent in Allis- 
Chalmers was directed to the majority's "unprecedented and 
unwarranted imposition of a `statement of reasons' requirement in a case 
where the justification for certification was[in J. Gibbons's opinion] 
glaringly apparent on the face of the record"). 
 
16. Indeed, as we acknowledged in Allis-Chalmers in "endors[ing]" Gumer, 
the purpose of the appellate courts' first suggestion - in 1974 - that 
district courts provide an explanation "where the justification for the 
certification is not apparent" was to facilitate appellate review in its 
threshold jurisdictional inquiry. See Gumer, 516 F.2d at 284, 286; Allis- 
Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364 ("It is essential .. . that a reviewing court 
have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions 
. . . and . . . approval . . . unsupported by evaluation of the facts or 
analysis of the law . . . .") (quoting Protective Committee v. Anderson, 
390 
U.S. 414, 434 (1968)). 
 
                                10 
  
that the absence of an explanation by the district court 
does not pose a jurisdictional bar when the propriety of the 
appeal may be discerned from the record. 
 
Therefore, to the extent Allis-Chalmers or a subsequent 
case may be read to have suggested (in dicta) that our 
mandatory statement-of-reasons requirement in Rule 54(b) 
certifications stands as a jurisdictional bar prohibiting 
appellate review even where the propriety of the certification 
is apparent from the record, we now clarify that the better 
reading of Allis-Chalmers is that although it is always the 
best practice for district courts to explain a decision to 
certify a judgment for appeal and we require them to do so, 
their failure to meet this directive need not result in 
dismissal or remand where judicial economy - which is the 
purpose of the finality requirement of S1291, as 
implemented in Rule 54(b)17 - would not be served.18 
Accordingly, we will proceed to reach the merits on appeal 
when a sufficient basis for a district court's certification is 
otherwise apparent.19 
 
Here, despite the District Court's inadvertence, the 
requirements of Rule 54(b) are clearly met. This case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 (identifying the "interest 
of 
sound judicial administration" as the standard against which a district 
court's 54(b) certification is to be judged). 
 
18. Cf. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220 ("[r]ejecting a `form-over-substance' 
approach that `would not significantly advance the purposes of Rule 
54(b) . . .' " in holding sufficient certification based on record) 
(quoting 
Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 849 F.2d 951, 953 
(5th Cir. 1988)); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc., 884 
F.2d 688, 694 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that purpose of Rule 54(b) is served 
by exercise of jurisdiction where justification for certification is clear 
on 
record). As the Court of Appeals observed in Kelly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 
directs that the rules be "construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action." 908 F.2d at 1221. 
 
19. This interpretation of Allis-Chalmers is consistent with the approach 
to Rule 54(b) certifications directed by the Supreme Court in Curtiss- 
Wright. As discussed supra note 14, Curtiss-Wright rejected our previous 
conclusion that the existence of a counterclaim will ordinarily defeat 
certification. That decision reflects the Supreme Court's general 
disapproval of inappropriately restrictive views of Rule 54(b) 
certification, 
and it counsels us to remain mindful of the competing concerns. 
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unquestionably involves multiple claims and parties; the 
decision below was a "final judgment" in the sense that it 
was an "ultimate disposition" of Carter's claims against the 
DA's office. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 7. The only real 
question is whether there is any just reason for delaying 
appeal until disposition of Carter's claims against the 
remaining defendants. The Supreme Court has interpreted 
this requirement as balancing considerations of judicial 
administrative interests (preservation of the federal policy 
against piecemeal appeals) and equities (justice to the 
litigants). See id., 446 U.S. at 8. Factors to be considered 
therefore include "whether the claims under review [are] 
separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and 
whether the nature of the claims already determined[is] 
such that no appellate court would have to decide the same 
issues more than once even if there were subsequent 
appeals." Id. Here, the issue presented is plainly separable 
and there is no real risk of duplicative appeals, as the 
Eleventh Amendment defense which was the basis of the 
District Court's dismissal of claims against the DA's Office 
is not asserted to be applicable to any of the remaining 
defendants.20 On the other hand, denial of an immediate 
appeal may pose a substantial risk that the District Court 
and the parties will be forced to undergo duplicative trials. 
Thus, on balance, the interests of judicial economy favor 
hearing the appeal. Finally, the importance of the issue 
presented by this appeal also militates in favor of our 
prompt consideration. Remand to the District Court for 
technical compliance at this time, when justification is 
already apparent, would unduly delay the proceedings. 
 
Therefore, although we adhere to our consistent 
requirement that the district courts provide a brief 
statement of reasons in certifying a judgment for appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) in this and in every case, we 
nevertheless hold that we have jurisdiction to hear this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Although there may be some factual overlap between the issues in 
this appeal and those in a potential future appeal concerning qualified 
immunity of the remaining defendants, the same issues are not likely to 
be presented. It is generally recognized that complete legal or factual 
distinction is not necessary to 54(b) certification. See 10 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,S 2657 at 50-54. 
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appeal because we are able to ascertain the propriety of the 
Rule 54(b) certification from the record. To hold otherwise 
would undermine the policies which Rule 54(b) seeks to 
advance. 
 
III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY 
 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
 
       The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
       construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
       commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
       States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
       Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
Despite its language, the Supreme Court has consistently 
interpreted the Amendment to immunize an unconsenting 
state "from suits brought in federal courts by her own 
citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 
(1984) (quoting Employees v. Missouri Dept. Of Public Health 
and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 180 (1973)). In addition, a suit 
may be barred "even though the state is not named a party 
to the action, as long as the state is the real party in 
interest." Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 658 (citing Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)) (emphasis added). 
 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is an affirmative defense 
and the burden is thus on the DA's Office to establish its 
immunity from suit. See Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Commission, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he 
party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity (and 
standing to benefit from its acceptance) bears the burden of 
proving its applicability."). We determine Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by examining the evidence on three 
factors: (1) the source of funding - i.e., whether payment of 
any judgment would come from the state's treasury, (2) the 
status of the agency/individual under state law, and (3) the 
degree of autonomy from state regulation.21 See Fitchik, 873 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The DA's Office asserts that a fourth factor was later added by the 
Supreme Court in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 
30 (1994) - viz., whether the functions at issue are "typically state or 
unquestionably local". The Hess Court did not adopt this distinction as 
a criterion for determining state status: it did not adopt or formulate 
any 
test. Indeed, the Court concluded that this purported "fourth factor" did 
not advance its inquiry. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 45. Moreover, to the 
extent that the distinction may be relevant, it appears to be subsumed 
within Fitchik's "status under state law" test. 
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F.2d 655.22 
 
Although the District Court applied the appropriate three 
factors, it erred both in its analysis of the individual 
factors, and in their balancing: 
 
(1) Funding - The DA's Office acknowl edges that it is 
funded by the City of Philadelphia and that the funds for 
any judgment against it would come from the City. 23 We 
have twice held en banc that the three Fitchik factors are 
not weighed evenly and that the "most important" question 
in determining Eleventh Amendment immunity is "whether 
any judgment would be paid from the state treasury." 
Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority, 953 F.2d 807, 816 (3d Cir. 1991); Fitchik, 873 
F.2d at 659. As we explained in Christy,"[t]he special 
emphasis we place upon the funding factor is supported by 
the Eleventh Amendment's central goal: the prevention of 
federal court judgments that must be paid out of the state's 
treasury." 54 F.3d at 1145.24 
 
We are not alone in emphasizing the importance of the 
funding factor. The Supreme Court recognized in Hess that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Fitchik reformatted our test for Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
the nine questions identified in Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 
247 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970). Funding 
encompasses the Urbano inquiry into whether satisfaction of a judgment 
would come from the state treasury, whether the agency had funds to 
satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign was immunized from 
responsibility for the agency's debt. Status encompasses the Urbano 
inquiry into how state law treated the agency generally, whether it was 
separately incorporated, could sue or be sued in its own right, or was 
immune from state taxation. Autonomy continues to address the Urbano 
inquiry into the degree of autonomy from state control. Fitchik 
specifically rejected the ninth Urbano factor, inquiry into whether the 
individual performed a governmental or proprietary function, as no 
longer relevant. See 873 F.2d at 659 n.2. 
 
23. See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 390. Cf. 16 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 1403 
(district attorney's expenses to be paid by county from its general 
funds). 
 
24. See also Hess, 513 U.S. at 50 (describing "prevention of federal-court 
judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury" as "the impetus 
for the Eleventh Amendment" and explaining that if the state is not 
obligated to pay any indebtedness, "then the Eleventh Amendment's core 
concern is not implicated"). 
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the vulnerability of the state's purse is considered "the most 
salient factor" in Eleventh Amendment determinations. See 
513 U.S. at 48 (citing courts of appeals cases at length). 
Indeed, the "vast majority of [courts of appeals] . . . have 
concluded that the state treasury factor is the most 
important factor to be considered . . . and, in practice, have 
generally accorded it dispositive weight." Id. at 49 (ellipses 
in original) (quoted in Christy, 54 F.3d at 1145). 
 
In Fitchik we concluded that non-applicability of state 
funds provides an "extremely strong" indication that an 
agency is not the alter-ego of the state, so that the first 
factor weighed heavily against a finding of immunity. 873 
F.2d at 664. The funding factor weighs even more heavily 
against immunity in this case than it did in Fitchik and 
Bolden, where approximately one-third and one-fourth, 
respectively, of the agencies' funds were provided by the 
states. See Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819. Here, despite the DA's 
efforts to elevate a statutory funding mandate to the status 
of "indirect" funding, it appears that no portion of the DA's 
funds are provided by the state and no portion of any 
judgment will be paid directly or indirectly by the state.25 As 
we reasoned in Bolden, "this most important fact weighs 
more heavily" against immunity as the proportion of state 
funding decreases. Id. 
 
(2) Status under State Law - The status  of the DA's Office 
under state law is necessarily derived from Pennsylvania's 
Constitution, statutory and decisional law.26 As we defined 
this second question in Fitchik, it is whether state law 
treats an agency as an independent entity or as a surrogate 
for (i.e., as an arm of) the state. See 873 F.2d at 662; 
Christy, 54 F.3d at 1148 (same). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Cf. Christy, 54 F.3d at 1145-1146 (rejecting arguments regarding 
state regulation of agency funding as irrelevant to the funding inquiry 
and reiterating that "under our case law" question is simply one of 
state's "affirmative obligation to pay"). 
 
26. See, e.g., Regents v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) (explaining that 
federal 
question of whether state instrumentality has "independent status . . . 
or is instead . . . `one of the United States' within the meaning of the 
Eleventh Amendment . . . . . can only be answered after considering the 
provisions of state law that define the agency's character"). 
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Pennsylvania's Constitution expressly defines District 
Attorneys as county rather than state officers. See Pa. 
Const., Article IX, Section 4 ("County officers shall consist 
of . . . district attorneys . . . and such others as may from 
time to time be provided by law."). The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has held equivalent language from a prior 
version of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be "crystal 
clear": the court explained that "[the Pennsylvania 
Constitution] states in the clearest imaginable language 
that district attorneys are county - not state- officers, and 
in Philadelphia, by virtue of [its Charter and a 
Constitutional amendment making county officers into 
officers of the city], are City - not State- officers, and no 
Procrustean stretch can alter or change or nullify this clear 
language." Chalfin v. Specter, 233 A.2d 562, 565 (Pa. 1967).27 
The DA's Office attempts to minimize this apparently 
controlling authority by arguing that "the only proposition 
with which four Justices agreed was that the Philadelphia 
District Attorney is subject to the Philadelphia Home Rule 
Charter for election purposes." As those four Justices 
clearly recognized, however, the Philadelphia Home Rule 
Charter by its terms applied only to Philadelphia officials, 
rather than state officials; and their opinions did not in any 
way differentiate between the District Attorney's status for 
election purposes or any other purposes. 
 
Pennsylvania's statutes also reflect the local status of the 
DA's Office. Under the Commonwealth Attorney's Act of 
1850, 71 P.S. SS 732-101, et seq., district attorneys were 
redefined as the "chief law enforcement officer[s] for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. The foregoing language is from the opinion of Chief Justice Bell, 
which was not joined by any other Justice. As the Chief Justice noted, 
however, "the majority of this 7 Judge Court agree . . . on this point and 
are convinced that under the Constitution of Pennsylvania . . . the 
District Attorney of Philadelphia is a City officer . . . ." Id. See also 
id. at 
578 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the present decision . . . FOUR 
Justices declare mathematically, specifically, and without equivocation 
that [the district attorney] is a CITY OFFICER.") (capitals in original); 
id. 
(Cohen, J., dissenting) ("The only position that enlists a majority of 
this 
Court determines that the District Attorney is a City Officer."); id. 
(Eagan, J., dissenting) ("Four of the seven members of this Court, 
including myself, are convinced that [the district attorney] is subject to 
the provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. . ."). 
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county in which [they were] elected." Id. at S 732-206(a).28 
Since that time, local district attorneys have been elected29 
and funded30 by their counties. Other provisions of 
Pennsylvania statutory law similarly treat district attorneys 
as county officials.31 The DA's Office, which has the burden 
of proving its affirmative defense, does not identify any 
Pennsylvania statutes treating local district attorneys as 
state, rather than county, officials. Finally, Pennsylvania's 
statute defining the scope of sovereign immunity does not 
encompass district attorneys within its detailed definitions 
of the agencies and employees protected from suit. 32 
 
Consistent with its constitutional and statutory law, 
Pennsylvania's case law defines district attorneys- 
Philadelphia District Attorneys in particular - as local, and 
expressly not state, officials. See Chalfin, 233 A.2d at 565. 
See also, e.g., Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 362 
A.2d 486, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976) ("District Attorneys and 
their assistants are officers of the counties in which they 
are elected and not officers of the Commonwealth.") (citing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Prior to 1850, district attorneys had been appointed by the Attorney 
General, a state executive, and were subject to his direct supervision and 
control. 
 
29. See Chalfin, 233 A.2d at 565 ("[I]t is important to further note that 
. . . the District Attorney of Philadelphia . . . is Elected in municipal 
[and 
not] State-wide elections . . . ."). 
 
30. See note 23, supra. 
 
31. For example, the Attorney General participates as a "state employee" 
in the state's retirement program, while district attorneys participate in 
their County Retirement System pursuant to County Pension Law. See 
16 P.S. SS11651-11682. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found it significant that "the 
powers and functions of the [district attorneys'] office are found in 
Title 
16, Counties, of Purdon's Statutes." Duggan v. 807 Liberty Ave. Inc., 288 
A.2d 750, 752 n.6. (Pa. 1972) (declining to hold district attorney as 
"officer of the Commonwealth" under jurisdiction of Commonwealth 
Court). See also Cross v. Meisel, 720 F. Supp. 486, 488 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 
1989) (explaining that case regarding "state officials" was irrelevant to 
suit against district attorney because, besides constitutional definition 
as 
county officers, district attorneys' duties are defined in the County Code 
and their expenses are paid by the county from its general funds). 
 
32. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 102, 8501-8528. 
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Section 401(a)(11) of the County Code, as amended 16 P.S. 
S 401(1)(11)).33 
 
The DA's Office argues that the various authorities 
holding district attorneys to be local officials are 
inapplicable because they did not involve prosecutorial 
conduct. In the "law enforcement and prosecutorial" 
context, according to the DA's Office, "courts have 
uniformly held that the District Attorney is an arm of the 
state". None of the Pennsylvania authorities cited, however, 
actually holds that a district attorney is a state officer or 
arm of the state in any context. Rather, these authorities 
relied upon by the DA's Office merely hold that district 
attorneys act on behalf of and in the name of the 
Commonwealth in investigating and prosecuting crimes 
within their district.34 See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Bauer, 
261 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1970) (finding only that district attorney 
has power and duty to represent the Commonwealth's 
interests in law enforcement). 
 
The District Court similarly equated simply acting in the 
name of the state with being an arm of the state entitled to 
share in its sovereign immunity. The District Court deemed 
the Pennsylvania authorities designating district attorneys 
as local officials irrelevant, because it erroneously believed 
performance of a sovereign function, such as investigation 
and prosecution of crime, was alone sufficient to accord 
local prosecutors sovereign immunity.35  This approach, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. The Commonwealth has similarly declined to hold assistant district 
attorneys to be state officials. See Specter v. Moak, 307 A.2d 884 (Pa. 
1973) (refusing to classify Philadelphia assistant district attorneys as 
state officers simply because they enforce Commonwealth penal laws of 
state-wide application "in the name of the Commonwealth"). 
 
34. In Chalfin, Chief Justice Bell pointedly noted that "the essential and 
principal and most important powers, functions, duties, limitations and 
boundaries of the District Attorney of Philadelphia involve only crimes 
committed - not throughout the Commonwealth but- only in the City of 
Philadelphia." 233 A.2d at 565. 
 
35. See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 390, 392 n.8 (dismissing constitutional 
provisions as "not in any way affect[ing] the District Attorney's function 
of investigating and prosecuting crimes in the name of the 
Commonwealth" and emphasizing that "[i]t would be hard to imagine 
functions more essential to the sovereignty of state government"). 
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however, clearly proves too much; many local officials act in 
the name of the state and carry out delegated sovereign 
functions. Under such an expansive theory, every police 
officer, for example, would be entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) 
("[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the 
[Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political 
subdivisions such as counties and municipalities even 
though such entities exercise a `slice of state power.' ").36 
 
Pennsylvania case law makes it clear that performance of 
an essential sovereign function on behalf of or in the name 
of the state does not give rise to state surrogate status 
under state law. See Specter v. Commonwealth, 341 A.2d 
481, 485-88 (Pa. 1975) (declaring Turnpike Commission 
unentitled to sovereign immunity although it was 
constituted as an "instrument of the Commonwealth" and 
performed "an essential government function of the 
Commonwealth"); Pennsylvania Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n. 
v. Commonwealth, 551 A.2d 361, 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) 
(finding district attorneys county officers, not state officers, 
although they are "charged with conducting criminal 
prosecutions in the name of the Commonwealth" and thus 
"perform sovereign functions of state government"); Specter 
v. Moak, 307 A.2d at 886 (rejecting Philadelphia Assistant 
District Attorneys' contention that "since they perform 
functions primarily on behalf of the Commonwealth they 
should be classified as state employees", reasoning that 
"[m]any officials" - such as the Mayor, Sheriff, Police 
Commissioner and City Solicitor - "perform state 
functions") (internal quotations omitted).37 Cf. Cross, 720 F. 
Supp. at 488 n.3 ("Although it is true that certain sovereign 
powers of the Commonwealth are delegated to a district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. The Lake Country Court observed that"some agencies exercising 
state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to 
protect the state treasury from liability" but rejected a more "expansive 
reading" that would effectively immunize every agency, unless it were 
expressly waived. Id. at 400-401 (emphasis added). 
 
37. The Moak Court further observed that it could not be argued that 
one is a state officer "merely because he has the duty to `cause . . . the 
laws of the State to be executed and enforced.' " Id. 
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attorney, this is true generally of county and local officials 
. . . ."). 
 
Moreover, even if it were true that district attorneys act 
as an arm of the state, entitled to its sovereign immunity, 
whenever they perform prosecutorial functions in the name 
of the Commonwealth, it would not follow that the Eleventh 
Amendment immunizes the conduct at issue here.38 The 
District Court mischaracterized the basis of Carter's claim 
as a prosecutorial function and declined to distinguish the 
Philadelphia DA's training/supervision/administrative 
activities from its core state function of prosecution. In 
dismissing the possibility of a meaningful analytical 
distinction between a district attorney's prosecutorial and 
policy-making functions,39 the District Court adopted a 
position which would inappropriately pull all functions of 
the office within the scope of its (purportedly sovereign) 
prosecutorial function. Other federal courts have taken a 
different view. They have acknowledged the obvious basis 
for distinction: making and applying county-wide policy 
differs from carrying out state-wide policy and they have, 
therefore, repeatedly differentiated between administrative 
and prosecutorial functions, generally finding the former to 
be local and the latter to be state. 
 
The most instructive (and analogous) case is Walker v. 
City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) from our 
sister court of appeals. Walker spent 19 years in prison 
after police officers and prosecutors covered up exculpatory 
evidence and committed perjury to secure his conviction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
38. Carter argues that the nature of the function should not be 
considered because the Eleventh Amendment focuses on the status of 
the entity as a whole, and the functional analysis is erroneously 
borrowed from section 1983 decisions. As the DA's Office observes, the 
propriety of the functional analysis has been reserved by the Supreme 
Court. See Regents v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900, 902 n.2 ("Nor is it necessary 
to decide whether there may be some state instrumentalities that qualify 
as `arms of the State' for some purposes but not others.") In the present 
case it is similarly unnecessary to reach this issue, as application of 
our 
Fitchik factors compels us to find that in Pennsylvania the prosecutor's 
office is not an arm of the state either generally or with respect to the 
managerial functions in question. 
 
39. See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 393. 
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Id. at 294. In his section 1983 action, Walker alleged that 
the district attorney's office failed adequately to train and 
supervise police with respect to the obligation to avoid use 
of perjury and suppression of exculpatory evidence. Id. at 
295, 298. In holding that Walker stated a proper claim 
against the district attorney's office, the Court of Appeals 
determined that "the district attorney's management of the 
office -- in particular the decision not to supervise or train 
[assistant district attorneys] on Brady40 and perjury issues" 
-- constituted policymaking for the county, rather than the 
state. Id. at 301. The Court observed that an earlier case 
holding that the district attorney is a state official41 was 
limited to "specific decisions . . . to prosecute." Id. (citing 
Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 152 n.5 (2d Cir. 
1991)). See also Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 
536 (2d Cir. 1993) ("With respect . . . to claims centering 
not on decisions whether or not, and on what charges, to 
prosecute but rather on the administration of the district 
attorney's office, the district attorney has been treated not 
as a state official but rather as an official of the 
municipality to which he is assigned.") (citing Walker and 
Gentile).42 As recently as last year, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit applied the Walker and Gentile holdings 
in finding a county liable under section 1983 for its district 
attorney's implementation of a policy regarding investigative 
procedures. See Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 
77 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 
Other courts of appeals have similarly recognized the 
hybrid nature of the district attorney's office- 
distinguishing between a DA's prosecutorial function and 
his role as elected county policymaker. See, e.g., Esteves v. 
Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1997) ("A county official 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
40. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) recognized that prosecutorial 
suppression of exculpatory evidence violates due process. 
 
41. See Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[W]hen 
prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State . . . 
represents the State, not the county."). 
 
42. The Gan court's parenthetical descriptions of Walker and Gentile 
indicate that it considered "administration" to include "office policy 
governing . . . subornation of perjury" and "office policy as to 
disciplining 
of law enforcement personnel". Id. 
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`pursues his duties as a state agent when he is enforcing 
state law or policy' " by conducting trials; but "[f]or those 
[remaining] duties that are administrative or managerial in 
nature, . . . a district attorney . . . functions as a final 
policymaker for the county.") (quoting Echols v. Parker, 909 
F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1990);43Pusey v. City of 
Youngstown, 142 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor is 
city official but acts as state agent when enforcing state law 
or policy); Owens v. Fulton County, 877 F.2d 947, 952 (11th 
Cir. 1989) ("[A]n official may simultaneously exercise county 
authority over some matters and state authority over 
others. . . . [A]n administrative function . .. might be 
characterized as an exercise of county power. However, . . . 
the district attorney's authority over prosecutorial decisions 
. . . is vested . . . pursuant to state authority."). Cf. Franklin 
v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 1998) (sheriff is acting as 
county official, and not acting as agent of state, at time of 
alleged failure to properly train subordinates or establish 
policies to protect arrestees); Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 
366, 370 (7th Cir. 1992) (sheriff is local official when 
serving as "chief law enforcement officer" of county, but 
arm of state when enforcing state court order).44 
 
The recurring theme that emerges from these cases is 
that county or municipal law enforcement officials may be 
State officials when they prosecute crimes or otherwise 
carry out policies established by the State, but serve as 
local policy makers when they manage or administer their 
own offices. Indeed, we ourselves concluded in Coleman v. 
Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir. 1996), that county 
prosecutors can have "a dual or hybrid status." When 
"enforcing their sworn duties to enforce the law . . . they act 
as agents of the State [but] when county prosecutors are 
called upon to perform administrative tasks unrelated to 
their strictly prosecutorial functions . . . the county 
prosecutor in effect acts on behalf of the county that is the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
43. See also Davis v. Ector County, Texas, 40 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(DA is local policy maker for purposes of personnel decision (firing), 
even 
though state official when enforcing state law). 
 
44. Cf. Commonwealth Attorney's Act of 1850, 71 P.S. SS 732-206(a), 
defining district attorneys as the "chief law enforcement officer[s] for 
the 
county in which [they were] elected." 
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situs of his or her office." Id. Absent direct intervention by 
the state, county prosecutors act as county officials when 
they are called upon to make administrative decisions on a 
local level. See Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1504 (applying New 
Jersey law).45 
 
Reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to 
Carter, it appears that the function complained of here is 
not prosecutorial, but administrative: it involves local 
policies relating to training, supervision and discipline, 
rather than decisions about whether and how to prosecute 
violations of state law. Therefore, even if a member of the 
Philadelphia DA's Office were deemed a state actor with 
respect to prosecutorial functions, she would nevertheless 
be a local policymaker with respect to the conduct at issue 
here. 
 
(3) Autonomy - When the District Court considered 
autonomy from the Commonwealth, it concluded that factor 
weighed strongly in favor of immunity.46  This finding is 
contrary to Pennsylvania's consciously and deliberately 
designed autonomous role for its district attorneys; it is 
also contrary to our prior decisions. In Pennsylvania, the 
Attorney General (the "AG") is without authority to replace 
a district attorney (who must be impeached, like other 
locally elected officials) and in Pennsylvania, unlike many 
other jurisdictions, the AG has no inherent authority to 
supersede a district attorney's decisions generally. 47 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. In Coleman we distinguished between the "day-to-day management of 
the prosecutor's office" - a function in which the DA acts as a county 
official - and the use of a "grossly erroneous" search warrant - an 
investigatory and prosecutorial function in which he acts as a state 
official. Id. at 1502, 1505. 
 
46. The District Court initially focused on the political autonomy of the 
DA's Office from the City of Philadelphia. Autonomy is measured, 
however, by the DA's Office's relationship with the Commonwealth (i.e., 
the more autonomous, the less an "alter ego" of the state). Moreover, the 
asserted autonomy from the City actually supports Carter's position with 
respect to the "failure to state a claim" argument addressed infra Section 
V, as it underscores the DA's role as final policymaker on law 
enforcement issues for the City. Cf. Degenova v. Sheriff of DuPage 
County, 18 F. Supp. 2d 848, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 
47. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 658 A.2d 801, 803 (Pa. Super. 1995) 
(describing Commonwealth v. Khorey/Trputec, 555 A.2d 100 (1989), as 
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Pennsylvania AG is permitted only a narrowly 
circumscribed power to supersede a district attorney in a 
particular criminal prosecution subject to court 
authorization under an abuse of discretion standard (or at 
the district attorney's own invitation).48  The mere possibility 
of supersession by the AG through cumbersome court 
proceedings is insufficient to support the District Court's 
conclusion that lack of autonomy weighed in favor of 
holding the DA's Office an arm of the state. 
 
To the contrary, in Coleman we concluded that "[d]espite 
the Attorney General's statutory power of supersession, 
` . . . the [county] prosecutors are largely independent of 
control by the attorney general . . . .' " 87 F.3d at 1504 
(quoting Morss v. Forbes, 132 A.2d 1, 16 (N.J. 1957)).49 As 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"establish[ing] categorically that the Attorney General, pursuant to 
statute which supplanted common law, has no authority to supersede 
the District Attorney"); Commonwealth v. Carsia, 491 A.2d 237, 251 (Pa. 
Super. 1985) (explaining that limited criminal jurisdiction extended to 
AG in Commonwealth Attorney's Act reflected legislature's concerns that 
it not "imping[e] upon the jurisdiction and duties of the constitutionally 
created office of county-elected district attorney"). 
 
48. See 72 P.S. S 732-205(a)(3)-(5). 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that although the AG 
"had the common law power to replace his own deputies," that "does not 
justify the conclusion that he now has the right to supersede an elected 
district attorney." Commonwealth v. Schab, 383 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1978). In 
refusing to require at the AG's request prosecution of a homicide the 
district attorney deemed excusable, the Court observed that "[i]t would 
be incongruous to place a district attorney in the position of being 
responsible to the electorate for the performance of his duties while 
actual control over his performance was, in effect, in the attorney 
general." Id. 
 
49. Moreover, the supersedure authority provided by New Jersey law is 
much more extensive than the limited supersedure under Pennsylvania 
law, in that it permits the AG broadly to supersede county prosecutors, 
leaving the prosecutors to "exercise only such powers and perform such 
duties as are required of them by the Attorney General." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 52:17(b)-106, quoted in Coleman. We held that even such a broad 
statutory supersedure scheme "provides county prosecutors . . . with a 
substantial degree of autonomy from the state government" in non- 
prosecutorial matters. Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1502. 
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we concluded in Coleman, "[i]t would be an unwarranted 
extension of the implications of the Attorney General's 
supersedure authority to conclude that the mere possibility 
of its exercise can somehow serve to bring [issues of "day- 
to-day management of the county prosecutor's office"] 
within the purview of the Attorney General's control." 87 
F.3d at 1502. 
 
In addition to the AG's power to supersede a particular 
failure to prosecute (with court approval), the District Court 
cited one other source of State control over district 
attorneys: the courts' power to supervise court proceedings.50 
This power, however, is equally applicable to all persons 
who appear in court; and it is plainly limited to the district 
attorney's prosecution function. The other potential means 
of "control" cited by the DA's Office - e.g., impeachment, 
legislative acts, funding mandate, reporting requirement - 
similarly do not represent any meaningful practical 
restraint on the district attorney's autonomy from the 
Commonwealth. Cf. Hess, 513 U.S. at 61-62 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) ("The critical inquiry . . . should be whether and 
to what extent the elected state government exercises 
oversight over the entity. . . . . The inquiry should turn on 
real, immediate control and oversight rather than on the 
potentiality of a state taking action to seize the reins.");51 
Fitchik, 873 F.2d 663 (evaluating autonomy in terms of 
independence from "supervision or control"). 
 
The limited state powers52 relied upon by the District 
Court and the DA's Office clearly do not extend to control 
over the district attorney's office administration in general, 
or over training, supervision and discipline of assistant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
50. See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 392. 
 
51. Justice O'Connor viewed the state's power to appoint and remove an 
agency's officers, to veto its actions, to receive its annual reports, and 
to 
approve or disapprove each of its rules and projects as evidence of the 
type of authority which would support a finding of immunity. Id. at 63. 
 
52. The power of the legislature (and to a lesser extent the courts) over 
the DA's Office is of course not narrowly limited; but "autonomy" would 
be a meaningless concept if it were rendered inapplicable by subjection 
to the (unexercised) legislative and judicial powers, to which all persons 
are subject. 
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district attorneys and police officers in particular. If we 
should focus on the particular function at issue in 
determining status under state law, we should do so in 
determining autonomy as well. Moreover, even a 
substantial degree of control by the state would cause the 
autonomy factor to weigh only slightly in favor of according 
immunity. See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664 ("Since the degree 
of control . . . is fairly substantial, we think that this factor 
counsels slightly in favor of according immunity . . . .") 
(emphasis added). See also Christy, 54 F.3d at 1149 ("[T]he 
significant control the Commonwealth exercises through 
the power to appoint all the members of the Commission 
weighs slightly in favor of Commission immunity. . . .") 
(emphasis added). 
 
Balancing - In balancing the Fitchik factors, the District 
Court concluded that although the first factor weighed 
against immunity, the remaining factors weighed "strongly 
in favor of finding that the District Attorney's Office, when 
performing its historic functions of investigating and 
prosecuting crimes on behalf of the Commonwealth, is an 
`arm of the state' not subject to suit in federal court without 
its consent." See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 393. Because, as 
explained above, the District Court misapplied the second 
and third factors, it erred in the balancing as well.53 
 
In Fitchik, we found that the non-applicability of state 
funds outweighed the combination of an ambiguous status 
under state law that balanced slightly in favor of immunity 
together with "fairly substantial" state control over the 
agency. See also Christy 54 F.3d at 1150 (finding that 
balance is "clearly struck" against immunity where funding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
53. Cf. Hess, 513 U.S. at 47 (stating that when indicators of immunity 
point in different directions, the court is guided primarily by the 
Eleventh Amendment's twin reasons for being: the States' dignity and 
their financial solvency). A suit for damages against a district 
attorney's 
office does not implicate the dignity of the state. The federal courts' 
consideration of status and autonomy under state law preserves the 
state's dignity by making its chosen structures controlling. Here, even if 
there is some doubt as to the entity's status under the law, and even if 
there is some degree of control by the state, the status and control do 
not rise to the level at which the exercise of judicial power over the 
DA's 
Office would offend the dignity of the State. 
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factor weighed against, and only one factor - autonomy - 
weighed slightly in favor).54 Here the funding factor weighs 
more heavily against immunity than in Fitchik and Bolden; 
the claim of state entity status under state law appears 
substantially weaker than in those cases in view of the 
express designation as a county official under 
constitutional, statutory and case law; and, at least for 
practical purposes, the autonomy of the DA's Office is 
greater than that of the transit authorities in those cases. 
Accordingly, as in Bolden, "[s]ince we are not prepared to 
overrule Fitchik, it follows that [the DA's Office] is not 
protected by the Eleventh Amendment." 953 F.2d at 821.55 
 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY 
 
We must begin with "[t]he presumption . . . that qualified 
rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
54. An illuminating comparison of circumstances in which we have 
found extension of immunity and those in which we have not appears in 
Bolden, 953 F.2d 815-16. We there observed that we found immunity 
where we concluded that the state intended the agency be considered a 
state agency for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the state was obligated 
to meet the agency's liabilities, the agency's commissioners were 
appointed by the state, and the state retained substantial power over the 
agency's actions. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc. v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. 
and N.J., 819 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1987). On the other hand, we refused to 
find immunity where an agency was state-created and largely state- 
funded but was "independent" and "direct[ed] its own actions" and was 
"responsible on its own for judgments resulting from [its] actions." 
Kovats v. Rutgers, 822 F.2d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
55. We note that the DA's Office provides an impressive-looking list of 
cases to support the proposition that "Judges across the country have 
agreed, virtually without exception, that district attorneys are state 
officials protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity." It must be 
remembered, however, that the determinative factors of funding, state 
law status and autonomy will vary from state to state, so that decisions 
concerning other states' district attorneys provide very little guidance 
absent a comparison of those factors. The cited cases do not withstand 
such a comparison because they involved state funding, state 
supervision, and/or a state court determination that prosecutors were 
state officials. The DA's Office omits to mention cases in which the same 
courts of appeals have held district attorneys in other states within 
their 
jurisdiction to be local officials. 
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government officials in the exercise of their duties" and the 
observation that the Supreme Court has been "quite 
sparing" in its recognition of absolute immunity. Burns v. 
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991).56  We also note that the 
Supreme Court directs a "functional" approach to immunity 
issues, id., and requires the official seeking absolute 
immunity to bear the burden of showing it is justified for 
the function in question, see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 
U.S. 259 (1993). 
 
With this guidance, we conclude that the alternative 
argument of the DA's Office that Carter's section 1983 
claims should have been dismissed due to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity lacks merit, because Carter does 
not complain about conduct on the part of the DA's Office 
in the course of his prosecution. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (prosecutors are immune from 
suit under section 1983 for "initiating and pursuing a 
criminal prosecution"). None of the cases cited by the DA's 
Office extends this prosecutorial immunity to 
administrative, rather than prosecutorial, conduct. 
 
Rather, as we have previously explained, "prosecutors are 
subject to varying levels of official immunity" and absolute 
prosecutorial immunity attaches only to "actions performed 
in a `quasi-judicial' role", such as participation in court 
proceedings and other conduct "intimately associated with 
the judicial phases" of litigation. Guiffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 
1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).57 
"By contrast, a prosecutor acting in an investigative or 
administrative capacity is protected only by qualified 
immunity." Id. (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31; Burns, 
500 U.S. at 483-84 n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 1938 n.2). 58 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
56. See also Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). 
57. In Imbler, the Supreme Court held "only that in initiating a 
prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune 
from a civil suit for damages under S 1983" and left open the question 
of whether absolute immunity would apply to "those aspects of the 
prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator 
or investigative officer rather than that of advocate" for the state. 424 
U.S. at 430-31. 
 
58. In Guiffre, we followed the Supreme Court's holding in Burns that a 
prosecutor is not absolutely immunized for advice given to police during 
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Qualified immunity protects official action "if the officer's 
behavior was `objectively reasonable' in light of the 
constitutional rights affected." Id. If Carter succeeds in 
establishing that the DA's Office defendants acted with 
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights- as Carter 
must in order to recover under section 1983, then a fortiori 
their conduct was not objectively reasonable. 
 
V. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1983 
 
As the District Court observed, the standard for personal 
liability under section 1983 is the same as that for 
municipal liability. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 
1118 (3d Cir. 1989). That standard was enunciated in 
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 
658, 694 (1978): "when execution of a government's policy 
or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 
whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent 
official policy, inflicts the injury . . . the government as an 
entity is responsible under S 1983." Where, as here, the 
policy in question concerns a failure to train or supervise 
municipal employees, liability under section 1983 requires 
a showing that the failure amounts to "deliberate 
indifference" to the rights of persons with whom those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the investigative stages of a criminal proceeding. See 31 F.3d at 1253, 
citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 496. 
 
In addressing the question left open in Imbler, and resolving a 
subsequent split among the courts of appeals, the Burns Court expressly 
rejected argument that a prosecutor's directory role in police 
investigations is sufficiently related to her advocate function. The 
Supreme Court explained that "[a]lmost any action by a prosecutor . . . 
could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether 
to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that 
expansive." Burns, 500 U.S. at 495. The Court also rejected the 
government's argument that adequate checks on prosecutorial 
misconduct in this context exist, observing that "one of the most 
important . . . checks, the judicial process, will not necessarily 
restrain 
a prosecutor's out-of-court activities that occur prior to the initiation 
of 
a prosecution." Id. Thus it concluded that neither common law nor policy 
considerations support an extension of absolute immunity, which applies 
"only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in 
judicial 
proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct." Id. at 494. 
 
                                29 
  
employees will come into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
 
The Court in Canton observed that failure to train may 
amount to deliberate indifference where the need for more 
or different training is obvious, and inadequacy very likely 
to result in violation of constitutional rights. See id. at 389. 
For example, if the police often violate rights, a need for 
further training might be obvious. See id. at 390 n.10. See 
also Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118 (deliberate indifference may 
be established where harm occurred on numerous previous 
occasions and officials failed to respond appropriately, or 
where risk of harm is great and obvious). 
 
Once again, the factually similar Walker case is 
instructive. The Walker court analyzed Canton's discussion 
of the deliberate indifference requirement and formulated a 
three-part test: in order for a municipality's failure to train 
or supervise to amount to deliberate indifference, it must be 
shown that (1) municipal policymakers know that 
employees will confront a particular situation; 59 (2) the 
situation involves a difficult choice or a history of 
employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an 
employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional 
rights. See Walker, 974 F.2d at 297-98. 
 
In the present case, as in Walker, elements (1) and (3) are 
plainly met: "city policymakers know to a moral certainty 
that police officers will be presented with opportunities to 
commit perjury or proceed against the innocent. Moreover, 
a failure by police officers to resist these opportunities will 
almost certainly result in deprivations of constitutional 
rights." Id. at 299. As for element (2), although it may 
usually be appropriate to assume employees will obey their 
oaths and the perjury laws, "where there is a history of 
conduct rendering this assumption untenable, city 
policymakers may display deliberate indifference by doing 
so." Id. at 300. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
59. Although the Walker Court, adopting language from Canton, 
indicated that the policymaker's knowledge should be"to a moral 
certainty", it does not appear that this qualifying phrase adds anything 
other than emphasis to the requirement of ordinary knowledge. 
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The Court of Appeals concluded that "Walker should be 
allowed to pursue discovery in order to determine whether 
there was a practice of condoning perjury (evidenced 
perhaps by a failure to discipline for perjury) 60 or a pattern 
of police misconduct sufficient to require the police 
department to train and supervise police officers to assure 
they tell the truth." Id. The same result should apply to 
Carter.61 
 
The District Court's insistence that Carter must identify 
a particular policy and attribute it to a policymaker, at the 
pleading stage without benefit of discovery, is unduly harsh.62 
Carter is not engaged in a mere fishing expedition. Carter 
alleges that he spent ten years in prison as a result of a 
pervasive pattern of egregious, unconstitutional conduct by 
Philadelphia's police. He surmises, reasonably, that such 
misconduct reflects inadequate training and supervision. 
He cannot be expected to know, without discovery, exactly 
what training policies were in place or how they were 
adopted.63 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
60. Cf. Gentile, 926 F.2d at 152 n.5 (predicating liability on "long 
history 
of negligent disciplinary practices regarding law enforcement personnel 
. . . ."). 
 
61. If Carter is able to demonstrate that the DA's failure to adopt a 
policy 
amounts to deliberate indifference, he must of course then establish that 
his conviction was "actually caused" by that failure. Canton, 489 U.S. at 
391; see also Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118 (requiring plaintiff to prove his 
injury "resulted from" the failure to adopt a policy). The Canton Court 
explained that actual causation turns on whether "the injury [would] 
have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that 
was not deficient in the identified respect." 489 U.S. at 391. 
 
62. The District Court read the Complaint as asserting only passive 
adoption by the DA's Office defendants of a policy imposed by the City. 
See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95. Nonetheless, an appropriately 
generous reading would indicate that the DA's Office defendants were 
the policymakers who adopted the inadequate training, supervision and 
discipline policies on behalf of the City. 
 
63. Cf. Gentile 926 F.2d at 152 ("Plaintiffs were not obliged to produce 
particular evidence that defendants had specific knowledge of a declared 
policy of the County . . . ."). 
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VI. 
 
We hold that (1) the Philadelphia District Attorney's 
Office is a local agency not within the Commonwealth's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of claims 
arising from administrative and policymaking - rather than 
prosecutorial - functions; (2) the official capacity claims are 
not alternatively barred by absolute prosecutorial 
immunity; and (3) the personal capacity claims have been 
adequately pled. Accordingly, we will reverse the District 
Court's dismissal of Carter's claims against the DA's Office 
and remand for further proceedings. 
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